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Titles I & IV of the LMRDA:
A Resolution of the Conflict of Remedies
Union election practices may violate provisions of Titles Fi and
IV 2 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
19593 (LMRDA) concurrently. Title I, embodying the "Members'
Bill of Rights," guarantees each member an equal right to nomi-
nate and vote within the union 4 and freedom of speech and as-
sembly in union affairs, 5 while Title IV imposes specific require-
ments for the conduct of union elections. 6 Despite this substantive
overlap, the procedures for enforcement of the Titles differ fun-
damentally: Title I is enforced by civil actions filed by members
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1970).
2. Id. §§ 481-83.
3. Id. §§ 153, 158-60, 186, 401-531 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the LMRDA].
4. Every member of a labor organization shall have equal rights and privileges within
such organization to nominate candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the
labor organization, to attend membership meetings, and to participate in the delibera-
tions of such meetings, subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization's
constitution and bylaws.
LMRDA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1970).
5. Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble
freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions, and to
express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in any election
of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to
the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of the
meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor
organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct
that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
Id. § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(2) (1970).
The types of rules that are "reasonable" under the proviso have not been established. See
generally Redding, Democracy, Collective Bargaining and LMRDA, in SYMPOSium ON LMRDA:
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 159, 210 (R.
Slovenko ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as SYmPOSiUM].
6. In any election . . . a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of
candidates and every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to
hold office (subject to § 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications uniformly
imposed) and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or
candidates of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper inter-
ference or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof .... Each
member in good standing shall be entitled to one vote. No member whose dues have
been withheld by his employer for payment to such organization pursuant to his volun-
tary authorization provided for in a collective bargaining agreement shall be declared
ineligible to vote or be a candidate for office in such organization by reason of alleged
delay or default in the payment of dues . . . . The election shall be conducted in
accordance with the constitution and bylaws of such organization ....
LMRDA § 401(e), 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1970).
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whose rights are infringed,7 but a member alleging violations
under Title IV is limited to filing a complaint, after exhausting his
intra-union remedies, with the Secretary of Labor,8 who may then
file an enforcement suit.9
Some courts, recognizing the general legislative intention that
the LMRDA authorize only minimal federal intervention into in-
ternal union affairs,10 have held that private enforcement of Title
I in overlap cases is preempted by the enforcement procedure of
Title IV." Commentators have argued that private remedies for
violations of Title I are both necessary for effective enforcement of
the LMRDA and permissible within the terms of the Act and the
intent of Congress, at least where the private enforcement suit is
brought prior to a union election.' 2 Post-election private remedies
have been held to be barred by LMRDA section 403,'3 which states
that "[t]he remedy provided by [Title IV] ... for challenging an
election already conducted"-a suit by the Secretary of Labor to
set aside the election-"shall be exclusive."'14 This reading of the
7. Section 102 permits a civil action "for such relief (including injunctions) as may be
appropriate." Id. § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
8. Id. § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1970).
9. (b) The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause
to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred, and has not been remedied,
he shall ... bring a civil action against the labor organization ... to set aside the invalid
election ....
(c) If, upon a preponderance of the evidence after a trial upon the merits, the court
finds-
(2) that the violation of section 481 of this title may have affected the outcome of an
election,
the court shall declare the election, if any, to be void and direct the conduct of a new
election under supervision of the Secretary.
Id. §§ 402(b), (c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 482(b), (c) (1970).
10. See text and notes at notes 64-72 infra. The minimization of intervention by requiring
Title IV complaints to be screened through the Secretary of Labor has, under some criteria,
rendered enforcement of the substantive guarantees of the LMRDA ineffectual. See Beaird,
Union Officer Election Provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 51
VA. L. REV. 1306, 1325-26 (1965); Note, Pre-Election Remedies Under the Landrum-Griffin Act:
The "Twilight Zone" Between Election Rights Under Title IV and the Guarantees of Titles I and V, 74
COLM. L. REV. 1105, 1114-21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as COLUN1BIA NOTE].
1 . See, e.g., Driscoll v. Operating Engineers Local 139, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973);
Robins v. Rarback, 325 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1963); cases cited note 32 infra.
12. See, e.g., Berchem, Labor Democrac. in America: The Impact of Titles I & IV of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 13 VILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1967); Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARv. L. REV. 727, 740 (1969); COLUMBIA NOTE, supra note 10, at
1112-21; Comment, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE
L.J. 407, 495-503 (1972) [hereinafter cited as YALE COMMENT].
13. Kempthorne v. United Transp. Union. 457 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1972); Colpo v. High-
way Truck Drivers Local 107. 305 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1962); see Driscoll v. Operating En-
gineers Local 139. 484 F.2d 682. 688 n.1 1(7th Cir. 1973).
14. LMRDA § 403. 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970).
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statute, however, is improper insofar as it requires preclusion of all
private enforcement suits brought or pending after the conclusion
of an election. Suits by union members that state clear violations
of Title I and seek remedies other than setting aside an election
should not be foreclosed either because of substantive overlap with
Title IV or because of section 403's narrow rule of remedial pre-
clusion.
This comment first examines the evolution of the judicial re-
sponse to the interplay between Title I and Title IV, identifying
three alternative approaches to overlap cases. It then evaluates the
legislative history of the LMRDA as evidence of the intended oper-
ation of the Act's enforcement scheme. The comment concludes
that a court presented with a union member's suit for violation of
his rights in connection with a union election must first determine
the sufficiency of the allegations under Title I, independently of
any consideration of their possible sufficiency under Title IV, and
apply a rule of preclusion only to the remedy of setting aside an
election already conducted.
I. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO THE INTERPLAY PROBLEM
A. Early Judicial Treatment of Overlap Cases
Two different approaches to overlap cases had appeared prior to
1964: first, analysis of Title I claims independently of the presence
of Title IV claims, and second, preclusion of Tide I claims by Title
IV remedies. An example of the first approach is Beckman v. Local
46, Bridge Workers,'5 a member's suit alleging a violation of the
equal right to vote provision of section 101(a)(1) of the Members'
Bill of Rights. The Seventh Circuit upheld a preliminary injunc-
tion restraining the removal of a ballot box and the counting of
the ballots, rejecting the defendant's assertion that because the
allegations concerned election abuses, the only proper procedure
for redress was the scheme outlined in Title IV. The court ruled
that there could be no preclusion by Title IV when the election
abuse affected individual rights protected by Title 1.16
The Second Circuit reached a different result in Robins v.
Rarback,17 dismissing a complaint alleging Title I violations for fail-
15. 314 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1963).
16. Id. at 850.
17. 325 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1963). A different panel of the Second Circuit had held only a
month earlier, in Harvey v. Calhoon, 324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1963), that the denial of "equal
rights .. .to nominate" under Title I could be the subject of a private suit for injunction
regardless of whether there was also a denial of "a reasonable opportunity ... for the
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ure to state a cause of action.18 Plaintiffs had argued that an equal
right to vote necessarily encompassed the right to cast an effective
vote, and that a vote could not be effective unless the election was
properly conducted in all its aspects. The court expressed doubt
that the allegations of enumerated "electoral abuses" were suffi-
cient under Title I, but held that since they would be proper under
Title IV, and since Congress intended that Title IV be enforced
only through the Secretary of Labor, it could not grant an injunc-
tion against the abusive election procedures in a private enforce-
ment suit for the violation of voting rights that stemmed from
them.1 9 In essence, the court allowed the exclusivity of the Title IV
remedy to preclude substantive claims under Title I,20 rather than
examining the complaint for sufficiency under Title I independ-
ently of its possible sufficiency under Title IV as the Beckman court
had done.
B. Calhoon v. Harvey
In 1964, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Calhoon v.
Harvey2 to resolve the conflicts and confusion existing in the ap-
nomination of candidates" under Title IV. Id. at 489. The Robins court distinguished its own
case on the ground that more extensive interference with election procedures was sought.
325 F.2d at 931. But see Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964), rev'g 324 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1963), discussed in text at notes 21-32 infra.
18. The court also dismissed as moot an appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion that would have required certain procedures to be followed in the election, since an
election had been held six months prior to the decision on appeal. 325 F.2d at 929. Compare
Judge Waterman's statement in concurrence that the proper ground for dismissing the
complaint altogether was the fact that the next election would not be held for another six
months, and plaintiff's rights, therefore, had not already been violated, thus precluding his
invocation of Title I. Id. at 933-34 (Waterman J., concurring).
19. Id. at 931. The problem with this analysis is that Congress never considered the
conflict between the enforcement procedures of the two titles, and the substantive preclusion
implied by the court's holding is thus not strongly supported. See text and notes at notes
56-80 infra.
20. Cf. Mamula v. United Steelworkers, 304 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1962), in which a union
president had sued to enjoin an election on the ground that the union's constitution and
bylaws failed to prescribe procedures to be followed in selecting nominees, and that he had,
therefore, been denied his section 101(a)(1) equal right to submit his name for candidacy.
The court reversed the district court's decree setting aside the election, which had subse-
quently taken place, on the ground that the specific and comprehensive coverage of nomina-
tion and election procedures in Title IV compelled the conclusion that it, not Title I,
provided the substantive standards governing the facts at hand. The court considered the
exclusivity of Title IV's enforcement scheme in concluding that plaintiff had no standing,
but did not make clear whether it also relied on that exclusivity of remedy in determining
the substantive scope of Title I. Arguably, a more proper ground for the decision would
have been the specific preclusion of the remedy of setting aside an election under section
403, 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970), rather than preclusion of the substantive Title I claim. See text
and notes at notes 81-87 infra.
21. 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
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proaches applied by the courts of appeals to the interplay
problem.22 Calhoon involved a challenge by individual union mem-
bers to union rules that had the effect of depriving all but the
incumbents and a few others of eligibility for nomination for union
office.2 3 The relief sought included damages and an injunction
against elections until the union revised its nomination system.2 4
The Supreme Court first considered the substantive scope of Title
I and held that the equal right to nominate candidates does not
encompass a right to nominate anyone, regardless of his eligibility.
The members' challenge, the Court said, was directed at eligibility
rules that were themselves applied without discrimination.2 5 That
challenge could not be maintained under Title I, although possible
violations of Title IV might be established.
In the second part of its opinion, the Court held that allegations
of a Title IV violation alone could not establish jurisdiction for a
private suit under Title I, and that the Secretary of Labor's right to
prosecute Title IV suits was exclusive.2 6 The Court stated that
Congress had "decided not to permit individuals to block or delay
union election by filing federal-court suits for violation of Title
IV,"'27 Since the allegations in Calhoon were insufficient under Title
I, even if it were assumed that they established violations of Title
IV, the members were not the proper plaintiffs in an enforcement
suit. This statement was not made to support the proposition that
Title IV enforcement procedures control overlap suits in which
both Title I and Title IV claims are presented, but to overrule the
court of appeals, which had held that Title IV allegations could be
considered in determining the sufficiency of a Title I complaint. 28
The holding of the Court was limited to a definition of the relative
substantive scopes of Titles I and IV and a distinctly separate con-
sideration of the exclusivity of enforcement when only Title IV
claims exist. The Court did not hold that the existence of putative
Title IV claims precludes an individual member's suit when the
Title I allegations are themselves sufficient.
22. Id. at 137.
23. Only those who had been members of the marine engineers' union for five years and
who had accumulated a certain amount of qualifying seatime or time as a union officer in
years prior to the election were eligible. See Harvey v. Calhoon, 221 F. Supp. 545, 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
24. 379 U.S. at 136 & n.4.
25. Id. at 139.
26. Id. at 139-40.
27. Id. at 140. The general exclusion of private suits under Title IV is subject to a single
exception under section 40 1(c), 29 U.S.C. § 48 1(c) (1970), which gives any bona fide candi-
date for union office a right to pre-election suit to acquire voting lists held by the union.
28. 379 U.S. at 140-41.
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Although Calhoon's narrow interpretation of the scope of Title I
restricts the number of cases in which individual suits may be
brought,29 cases still arise in which election procedures in violation
of Title IV also have a discriminatory impact on voting or nominat-
ing rights or deny the right of free speech, and in which a true
overlap would thus exist.30 In such cases, Calhoon does not apply,
and preclusion of substantive Title I claims by the remedial ex-
clusivity of Title IV would be improper.
C. Judicial Approaches in Overlap Cases Since Calhoon
1. Preclusion of Title I Remedies. Driscoll v. Operating Engineers
Local 139 31 illustrates the broad preclusive effect some courts have
given Title IV under the authority of Calhoon.32 A union bylaw
requiring each candidate for union office to file an anticommunist
affidavit was challenged as violating both the free speech 33 and
equal rights34 provisions of Title I, the Members' Bill of Rights.
The Seventh Circuit held that the Title I remedy was precluded
because of the overlapping coverage of Title IV, whether an elec-
tion had been held or was yet to be held, and that the complaint
should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.3 5
The plaintiff in Driscoll attempted to distinguish Calhoon on the
ground that the latter case involved alleged violations of only the
equal right to nominate and not of the free speech guarantee as
well.36 The court rejected this distinction, however, and stated,
without any direct consideration of the allegations' independent
29. A broad application of the Calhoon holding to other Title I claims not technically
controlled by the case, such as alleged denials of free speech under section 101(a)(2), would
considerably reduce the substantive effect of Title I. See generally text and notes at notes
31-50 infra. Several commentators have suggested that Calhoon be overruled or narrowly
read to avoid that result. See, e.g., Berchem, supra note 12, at 10; COLUMBIA NOTE, supra
note 10, at 1112 & n.45; YALE COMMENT, supra note 12 at 551. See also Comment, Fair Elec-
tion Procedures under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 and the United
Mine Workers, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 76, 80 (1970).
30. Cf. Kleiler, The Impact of Titles I-VI of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 3 GA. L. REV. 378, 379
(1969), noting that nearly as many suits had been filed prior to 1969 under Title I as under
all other sections of the LMRDA. The number of potential overlap suits can be assumed to
be significant. See also cases cited at note 32 infra.
31. 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974).
32. See, e.g., McDonough v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 470 F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir.
1972); McGuire v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 426 F.2d 504, 507-08 (6th Cir.
1970); Spivey v. Trainmen, No. 10317, 69 L.R.R.M. 2709 (N.D. Ga. 1968); McArthy v. Dis-
trict 9 Machinists, 252 F. Supp. 350, 352 (D. Mo. 1966); Verbiscus v. Local 49, Marine
Workers, 238 F. Supp. 848, 849-50 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
33. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 41 1(a)(2) (1970). See note 5 supra.
34. Id. § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 41 l(a)(1) (1970). See note 4 supra.
35. 484 F.2d at 688 n.11.
36. Id.
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sufficiency under Title I, that the allegations were outside the
court's jurisdiction in a private suit, since they "basically related" to
eligibility within Title IV.37 This holding misapplies Calhoon, in
which the Court construed the provisions of the equal rights sec-
tion directly rather than relying solely on the possible sufficiency of
the allegations under Title IV. Although the presence of Title IV
allegations in Calhoon could not give the court jurisdiction under
Title 1,38 the presence of Title IV allegations in Driscoll should not
have foreclosed it. If the complaint established a prima facie viola-
tion of the member's right to "express any views," 39 the court
should have taken jurisdiction in an action to declare the violative
rule void under the explicit provisions of Title 1.40
Under the court's holding in Driscoll, whenever allegations of the
violation of protected individual rights in connection with an elec-
tion "basically relate" to Title IV, suits by members under Title I
are precluded. The individual member's remedy under Title IV,
further, must be postponed until after an election is held, at which
point he is limited to filing a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor.41 Through this chain of reasoning, vindication of certain
rights of union members under Title I is virtually foreclosed.
Where the alleged violation of Titles I and IV stems from provi-
sions of the union rules, it affects individual rights without relation
to any particular election. If a litigant is not permitted to bring an
action under Title I before an election and has his Title I remedies
mooted by the occurrence of the election, the abuse can continue
indefinitely unless the Secretary of Labor agrees to bring suit42 and
the court finds that the abuse may have affected the outcome of
the election. 43
Such cases need not be viewed in a pre- or post-election context
at all.44 Section 403 specifically provides that the remedy for chal-
37. Id.
38. See text at note 26 supra.
39. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1970).
40. See id. § 10 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1970), declaring void any provision of the union
constitution or bylaws that is inconsistent with the guarantees of section 101.
41. See 484 F.2d at 688; Venet v. Local 606, Carpenters, 342 F. Supp. 819, 820 (D. Minn.
1972); text and notes at notes 8-9 supra.
42. During the years 1967 to 1972, the Secretary brought suit in only twenty-four to
forty-five percent of complaints in which he had made a determination of probable cause
that a violation had occurred. See COLUMBIA NOTE, supra note 10, 1118-19 & n.83.
43. This is the standard for setting aside an election. LMRDA § 402(c)(2); 29 U.S.C.
§ 482(c)(2) (1970), quoted at note 9, supra.
44. Compare Kempthorne v. United Transportation Union, 457 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1972),
with Amalgamated Clothing Workers Rank & File v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, joint
Board, 473 F.2d 1303 (3d Cir. 1973).
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lenging a conducted election is exclusive, not that the occurrence
of an election bars all other actions; the exclusivity principle prop-
erly operates only when the member seeks relief against a con-
ducted election.
2. The "Articulated Policy of Suppression" Requirement. The Second
Circuit, in Schonfeld v. Penza,45 forged a modified view of the extent
to which Title IV precludes Title I suits. The case involved suits
seeking to restrain the union from enforcing penalties imposed
upon Schonfeld, a former union officer, after a trial held by the
union. The sanctions included removal from office and a declara-
tion that he was ineligible to run for union office for five years.
Schonfeld alleged that the trial had been unfairly run and that its
purpose was to limit his efforts to "democratize" the union.46
The court viewed the complaint as containing two severable com-
ponents-a claim that Schonfeld's ineligibility denied union mem-
bers the equal right to vote and nominate, and a claim that the sanc-
tions denied Schonfeld and others their right of free speech. The
first claim was analyzed, under Calhoon, as involving no discrimina-
tion and therefore not being within the jurisdiction of the court
in a section 101(a)(1) suit.47 As the court then proceeded, prop-
erly, to evaluate the sufficiency of the allegations independently
under section 101(a)(2), it articulated an intermediate approach to
the interplay problem. The court stated that in reconciling "Title I
rights and Title IV procedural requirements," it would intervene
in union activities only where the alleged violation of both Titles
could be said, "as a result of established union history or articu-
lated policy, to be part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt by
union officials to suppress dissent within the union. ' 48
Once it is recognized that certain overlap cases are cognizable in
federal court at the instance of an individual union member, a test
of purposeful and articulated suppression is not the proper
method for determining whether a given case falls within that
category. That test does not appear in Title I, which guarantees
members' rights against abridgement by any discrimination or
suppression, not only that resulting from "articulated policy. '49
45. 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 901.
47. Id. at 902.
48. Id. at 904. Courts within the Second Circuit have consistently applied this test. See, e.g.,
Fritsch v. District 9, Painters, 493 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1974); Russo v. Local 676, Plumbers,
372 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Conn. 1974); Schonfeld v. Raftery, 335 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
49. Moreover, there is no statutory support for requiring a member to prove intent only
in cases in which the violation occurred in relation to an election.
1974]
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The effect of Schonfeld's additional requirement is a partial substan-
tive preclusion of section 101(a)(2) claims. 50
3. Independent Analysis of Claims. The third post-Calhoon ap-
proach to the interplay problem, which has received little attention,
involves a simple, straightforward analysis like that applied by the
Third Circuit in Depew v. Edmiston.5' The plaintiffs in Depew had
nominated one plaintiff, Caldarelli, to run for office in the
Trainmen's Union. Caldarelli was declared ineligible on the basis
of a bylaw that required those members restricted to yardwork, as
he was, to transfer to another local. The plaintiffs alleged a viola-
tion of the equal rights provision of Title I on the ground that the
bylaw was enforced in a discriminatory fashion and sought to en-
join a scheduled election. The circuit court held that the district
court had jurisdiction to determine whether the alleged discrimina-
tion had occurred.5 2
Although the alleged violations related to eligibility require-
ments, which are covered by Title IV, the court found sufficient
allegations of discrimination to raise a prima facie independent
violation of Title 1.53 The case thus involved a true overlap, in
contrast with the Calhoon case, and the court did not apply a rule of
substantive preclusion of Title I claims. This approach is in accord
with the legislative history and language of the statute, which indi-
cate the distinctiveness of Title I and Title IV procedures and
substantive rights. The court of appeals directed the district court
on remand to consider the substantiality of the claims under sec-
tion 101(a)(1), without reference to their possible sufficiency
under Title IV.54
These divergent approaches to overlap cases after Calhoon indi-
cate continued confusion and conflict in the lower courts. Some
courts have given effect to Calhoon through a rule of preclusion of
Title I claims where Title IV also applies. The shortcomings of this
expanded Calhoon rule in assuring consistent protection of statu-
tory rights have been enumerated and discussed elsewhere. 55 The
50. Cf. Driscoll v. Operating Engineers Local 139, 484 F.2d 682, 687-88 (7th Cir. 1973),
recognizing the Schonfeld test as the sole exception to "the broad mandate of Caloon," and
finding the test not satisfied on the facts before it. See also Schonfeld v. Raftery, 359 F. Supp.
380 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Fritsch v. District 9, Painters, 493 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir.
1974).
51. 386 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1967).
52. Id. at 715.
53. See id. at 714 & n.8.
54. Id. at 715.
55. See authorities cited at notes 10 & 12 supra.
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minority approach in overlap cases, based on independent evalua-
tion of the sufficiency of the allegations under Title I and on
preclusion only of the private remedy of setting aside an election
already held, would avoid these shortcomings and yet be consistent
with the legislative history of the LMRDA.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA
AND THE INTERPLAY PROBLEM
The legislative history of the LMRDA does not conclusively ex-
plicate the intended relationship of Titles I and IV, because Con-
gress never seriously considered the interplay question; indeed,
Congress was barely aware of its existence. 56 Although both titles
were products of the McClellan hearings of 1958, the provisions
that now comprise Title IV were drafted, debated, and approved
by the Senate before Title I was introduced. 57 Congress's intention
that suit by the Secretary of Labor be the exclusive post-election
remedy under Title IV cannot, therefore, be extended to Title I
suits in the absence of specific provision for such an extension.
Only affirmative evidence from the legislative history of Title I
could require that extension. Affirmative evidence would also be
required to justify subsuming Title I's enforcement procedures
under those of Title IV in the pre-election overlap cases. Neither
56. A speech by Representative McCormack marked one of the few instances of recog-
nition of a potential interplay problem:
It would appear that the choice of a civil suit by an aggrieved member for violations of
Title I was a deliberate alternative to a civil suit by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of
an aggrieved member. For example, title IV of the Landrum-Griffin bill, like the com-
mittee bill, substitutes a civil suit by an aggrieved individual in lieu of a suit by the
Secretary of Labor such as is provided in the Senate passed bill [for Tide IV]. Yet both
types of suits are authorized with respect to the rights granted by title I. The result is
conflict and confusion.
105 CONrG. REc. 15836 (1959). Unfortunately, this brief mention of the potential problem
did not spark serious debate of the issue.
57. The LMRDA went through several successive formulations before the Members' Bill
of Rights was added. Senator Kennedy introduced S. 3454, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958),
followed by S. 3751, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). These were combined with the other bills
pending in the Senate Labor Committee into one bill, S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
S. REP. No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). This bill, which became known as the
Kennedy-Ives Bill, was passed by the Senate by a vote of 88-1 on June 23, 1958, 104 CONG.
REC. 11486 (1958), but was killed by the House on Aug. 18, 1958, 104 CONG. REc. 18288
(1958).
On January 20, 1959, Senator Kennedy introduced the Kennedy-Ervin Bill, S. 505, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). After a number of changes were made by the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, the bill was renumbered S. 1555 and introduced as a "clean bill"
on March 25. 1959. The bill was reported out by the committee on April 14, still without a
Members' Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights was finally added on April 21, and the entire bill
was passed by the Senate on April 25. Thus, for most of the time it was being considered,
the labor reform legislation did not have a Members' Bill of Rights.
The University of Chicago Law Review
of these conclusions can be supported; instead, the available evi-
dence indicates a congressional intention that Title I rights be fully
enforced.
The Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or
Management Field (the McClellan Committee) extensively investi-
gated the abuses of union leaders and the relation of organized
crime to organized labor,58 ultimately finding "a significant lack of
democratic procedures in the unions studied."59 The Committee,
in order to insure union democracy, recommended federal legis-
lation guaranteeing and regulating union elections. 60 This recom-
mendation formed the basis of what was to become Title IV of the
LMRDA. 61
The substantive provisions of Title IV did not change signifi-
cantly in the successive forms of the Senate bill,62 and the substan-
tive provisions of the House bill were nearly identical to those of
the Senate bill. 63 The method of enforcement, however, changed
significantly as the Act took shape.
The administrative enforcement provisions of the present Title
IV had first been included in a bill introduced by Senator Kennedy
in 1958 and reintroduced in 1959.64 The Senate later rejected a bill
offered by Senator Goldwater that was designed to give individual
members as well as the Secretary of Labor the power to sue to
enforce Title IV.65 The Supreme Court, in Trbovich v. UMW,66
later summarized the Senate's reason for this rejection as the fear
that unions would be required to defend themselves at great ex-
58. See S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959); S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
59. S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
60. Id. at 452.
61. Contemporary commentators differed on the necessity for federal legislation to
police union election abuses. Compare Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72
HARv. L. REV. 609, 624-29 (1959), with Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64
HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1069-71 (1951).
62. See note 57 supra.
63. The most important differences between the House bill and the original Kennedy-
Ervin Senate bill were a reduction of the period for exhaustion of union- remedies from
four months to three, deletion of the word "reasonable" from the opportunity to nominate
section, and other changes to assure that members' free speech was protected outside as
well as inside the union hall. Goldwater, The Legislative History and Purposes of LMRDA, in
SYMPosIuM, supra note 5, at 32, 34-35, 52.
64. S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). Senator Kennedy described the bill as a "modest
proposal" that would protect union members "without undue interference in the internal
affairs of what I believe are essentially private institutions-that is, American trade unions."
104 CONG. REC. 7954 (1958).
65. 105 CONG. REC. 1259 (1959).
66. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
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pense in multiple simultaneous suits and that the private enforce-
ment procedure would permit the bringing of frivolous com-
plaints, which the administrative enforcement procedure was
intended to screen.67 The issue of private enforcement resurfaced
in the House after the bill had passed the Senate, and the bill that
passed the House provided for private actions to enforce election
rights.68 The Senate's exclusive administrative enforcement model
prevailed, however, in the Joint Conference Committee.69
Courts have relied on this history of consideration and rejection
of private enforcement schemes, coupled with the purpose of
Title IV as expressed by the Senate report-to allow only minimal
federal interference in union affairs70-as authority for the prop-
osition that Title IV's enforcement procedure is exclusive of all
member suits in the post-election period.7 1 Because Title I was not
considered until later, however, these arguments are conclusive
only for private suits under Title IV, not for post-election Title I
suits.7 2
Title IV is directed at abuses associated with elections; its remedy
for these abuses is a new election upon a showing that the violation
might have affected the outcome of the election. A member's suit
for vindication of a Title I right that does not seek to overturn an
election is not within the area in which the Title IV remedy is
exclusive. Just as Tide IV could not be read to preclude an action
for damages for an assault if the suit was in the post-election
period and the assault preceded and was factually related to the
election, it cannot be viewed to exclude analogous Title I suits if
the legislative history of Title I demonstrates no congressional in-
tent that such a result be required.
Senator McClellan originally introduced Title I after various
labor reform bills had been debated over a course of almost two
years, and after the Senate version of the LMRDA had already
been thoroughly considered.7 3 In its original form, the bill did not
67. Id. at 532.
68. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402 (1959).
69. JOINT CON. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 402, at 17 (1959).
70. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959).
71. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Operating Engineers Local 139, 484 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1973).
72. See also S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1959), indicating that the ex-
clusivity applies only to the remedy of overturning an election.
73. The proposal came as a surprise to many Senators, who complained they were not
given adequate time to research its provisions, 105 CONG. REC. 6697 (1959). The impetus for
the amendment came from two sources-the American Civil Liberties Union and the Senate
committee minority report that accompanied the Kennedy-Ives bill. The ACLU had been
advocating such reforms for over a decade. See Leider, LMRDA and Its Setting, in SY.%tPosiu.i,
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provide for member suits, but like Title IV, required suits to be
brought by the Secretary of Labor.7 4 Although Senator Kennedy
and others objected on the ground that individual suits were neces-
sary to provide union members with effective tools for enforcing
their rights,7 5 the Members' Bill of Rights was initially passed with
Senator McClellan's enforcement procedure. 76
A new Bill of Rights, introduced by Senator Kuchel, improved
some of the hastily drafted wording of the McClellan bill and
eliminated the right of the Secretary of Labor to sue in the
member's behalf.77 Several Senators expressed an intention by this
change to assure that the Secretary of Labor did not "run every
union. 17 8 The right of individual members to bring suit conflicted
with the earlier endorsed Senate policy of permitting only minimal
interference in intraunion affairs, but the Senate allowed that pol-
icy to yield in order to assure effective enforcement of Title I
rights.
Neither the floor debates nor the Senate and House reports
indicate a congressional intention to subsume the Title I enforce-
ment procedures under those of Title IV in overlap cases. Indeed,
the statements of several Senators concerning the desirability of
independent proceedings under Title I,79 viewed in light of the
order in which the two titles were passed, can be read as indicating
a contrary intent. The writings of several Congressmen, appearing
soon after the enactment of the LMRDA, although not recognizing
any interplay problem, exhibit concern over any limitation of
union members' rights under Title 1.80 Given this strong interest in
supra note 5, at 12, 14. The Senate minority report cited the absence of a bill of rights as
the reason for its conclusion that "[the Act] fails to achieve the objective which the Ameri-
can public demands." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1959). For a slightly differ-
ent analysis of the pressures that led to the passage of the LMRDA, see Cox, Internal Affairs
of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MicH. L. REV. 819, 820 (1960).
74. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, § 3 (1959); see 105 CONG. REc. 6976 (1959).
75. See 105 CONG. REc. 6483 (1959) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
76. See note 74 supra. See 105 CONG. REC. 6492 (1959). The bill was reconsidered, how-
ever, partly because of the fear that allowing interference by the Secretary of Labor might
set a precedent for federal intervention that would be applicable in all civil rights matters.
See'Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851,
859 (1960).
77. S. 1555, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. § 102 (1959) (as amended); see 105 CONG. REc. 6720
(1959) (remarks of Senator Kuchel).
78. See, e.g., 105 CONG. REc. 6717 (1959) (remarks of Senator Javits); id. at 6721
(remarks of Senator Clark); id. at 6722 (remarks of Senator Cooper); id. at 6726 (remarks
of Senator Kefauver).
79. See note 78 supra.
80. See, e.g., Goldwater, supra note 63, at 35; Roosevelt, LMRDA in the Congressional Arena,
in Sy, posiumr, supra note 5, at 125, 128.
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full enforcement of Title I, a broad substantive preclusion based
solely on overlap with Title IV is not justified by the legislative
history of the LMRDA.
III. A RESOLUTION OF THE INTERPLAY PROBLEM
An overbroad interpretation of the legislative intention to
minimize governmental intrusions into union affairs and of the
Supreme Court's holding in Calhoon v. Harvey has led some courts
to deny relief to union members under a construction of the
LMRDA that renders the Members' Bill of Rights virtually unen-
forceable in connection with union elections. A more rational ap-
proach to overlap cases, and one that is consistent with the statute,
its legislative history, and the Court's holding in Calhoon, would be
based on the principles that substantive preclusion of Title I claims
because of Title IV's exclusivity of remedy is improper, and that
preclusion of remedies in Title I suits is proper only when the
individual member seeks to set aside or otherwise directly chal-
lenges an election already held.
The substantive scope of Title I in relation to elections is nar-
rower than the scope of Title IV, 8' yet within its domain, Title I
should be read so as to allow private suits regardless of any over-
lap. In enacting Title I, Congress intended to grant basic individual
rights and to ensure the protection of those rights by allowing
private enforcement. It is only in cases like Calhoon, where no viola-
tion of Title I rights is established and the only remaining cause of'
action would be under Title IV, that the exclusivity of enforcement
under Title IV should justify dismissal of a member's suit.
If a valid Title I claim has been established, the second step is to
inquire into the relief sought. The remedy for Title IV violations
that may not be sought in a private suit is the setting aside of an
election at the instance of the Secretary of Labor. Under section
403, this "remedy . . . for challenging an election already con-
ducted" is exclusive. 82 In overlap cases, however, it is consistent
with both the language of section 403 and the legislative purpose to
allow suits under Title I for relief even in post-election periods that
does not constitute setting aside or otherwise challenging the elec-
tion. In some ways, these remedies may be characterized as merely
"pre-next-election" relief. Where, for example, a provision of the
union constitution is alleged to violate Title I, section 101(5)(b) 83
81. See text and notes at notes 29-30 supra.
82. 29 U.S.C. § 483 (1970).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 411(5)(b) (1970).
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allows a private suit to invalidate the provision. The temporal rela-
tion of the suit to an election is irrelevant because the violation of
the member's Title I rights is produced by the rule, irrespective of
any particular election.8 4 This type of suit does not encroach on the
ambit of litigation delegated exclusively to the Secretary and
should therefore be permitted.
Similarly, a suit to enjoin all elections until the union's proce-
dures are amended to comply with Tide I guarantees of free
speech and equal rights should not be dismissed automatically on
the ground that the election pending at the time the suit was
brought has been held, without independent consideration of tra-
ditional equitable criteria. If periodic elections are held or if the
next election has been scheduled, relief can clearly be granted.8 5
The Title I claim is neither precluded by section 403 nor mooted,
since the prospective relief sought is not tied to the particular elec-
tion already conducted.
In the Driscoll case,86 the Seventh Circuit found Driscoll's Title I
claim precluded by an overlapping Tide IV violation. Under the
first step in the recommended analysis, this overlap would have
been irrelevant in determining the substantive sufficiency of the
claim. The court noted that there were arguable violations of both
titles; it should have allowed the district court to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the independent Title I allegation.8 7
The second step in the recommended analysis requires consider-
ation of the remedy sought. Driscoll requested the district court to
enjoin the union from requiring candidates for office to sign the
anticommunist affidavit. This injunction was not tied to a particu-
lar election, and should not have been held barred by Title IV's
exclusivity of remedy. Under the analysis recommended in this
comment, the case should have been remanded for trial on the
merits. If the district court found that there had been a denial of
the member's free speech or equal right to vote or nominate as
84. Even where the relief sought relates more closely to the election, as in the case of a
suit for damages for violation of Title I rights during the conduct of an election, preclusion
is arguably improper. The damages are asked for the denial of individual rights, and a
broad challenge of the election like that involved in a suit to set aside the election is not
presented. Thus, the remedy should not be precluded under Title IV.
85. But cf. Robins v. Rarback, 325 F.2d 929, 929, 934 (2d Cir. 1963) (declaring appeal
from denial of motion for preliminary injunction of election moot because election had
been held, although next election was scheduled to be held six months later).
86. See text and notes at notes 31-43 supra.
87. But see Driscoll v. Operating Engineers Local 139, 484 F.2d 682, 686 n.9 (2d Cir.
1973). The court read Calhoon as precluding jurisdiction over an individual member's com-
plaint where it states a putative Tide IV claim.
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guaranteed by Title I, it should have granted the injunction against
the union.
CONCLUSION
The interplay of Title I and Title IV of the LMRDA has con-
tinued as a source of confusion. Relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Calhoon, courts have reached contradictory results in
overlap cases. The dominant approach has been to regard Title IV
as precluding private Title I suits. This comment has argued that
this result is required neither by the legislative history of the statute
nor by Calhoon. Instead, it has suggested that a simple two-step
analysis, involving independent examination of claims under
Title I and application of a rule of preclusion only in terms of
the remedy sought will serve to enforce the statutory purpose
of providing members a means of vindicating their rights with-
out undue disruption of internal union affairs.
James M. Harris
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